A model of oil supply from known reserves is developed to incorporate geological and engineering principles in the oil field operator's decision problem. Oil production from existing wells within an oil field is isolated from the drilling of new wells. The geo-engineering Ž . rule known as maximum efficient reco¨ery MER is nested within the economic model to test the hypothesis that production from established fields is invariant to the price of oil. The econometric model is applied to quarterly data from seven Montana oil fields. The MER model is strongly rejected by the data, providing evidence that oil supply models should include economic as well as geo-engineering principles. ᮊ 1998 Academic Press
INTRODUCTION
The US oil and gas industry is the subject of a large number of studies that model the process of petroleum supply in the United States. Petroleum supply models have received widespread attention because of their long-standing use for policy analysis. The primary concern of these models is the response of domestic oil and gas production to changes in the price received by producers. Most petroleum supply models focus on the upstream sector of the industry, where the operations designed to find and develop oil and gas reserves occur. The principal output response is generally viewed as stemming from changes in exploration and drilling activity. Therefore, much theoretical and empirical work exists on the response of exploration and reserve additions to price changes. 1 Although alterations in the level of exploratory activities affect future production, changes in output from established fields significantly impact domestic production because production from mature fields provides the vast majority of oil w x and gas produced. However, with the notable recent exceptions of Pesaran's 33 w x aggregate model of the UK Continental Shelf and Deacon's 7 calibrated production model for the U.S., most existing supply models assume that production from established fields is governed mainly by geological and engineering considerations *E-mail: geoff.black@marist.edu. Gould 14 , and MacAvoy and Pindyck 29 . and is invariant to changes in the price received by producers. 2 The geo-engineering framework for oil and gas production is known as the maximum efficient Ž . reco¨ery MER rule. In this model, production per unit time declines exogenously at a rate determined by the physical characteristics of the field. The veracity of the MER hypothesis has significant policy implications for petroleum supply. For example, the MER model predicts that a severance tax will shorten the length of the production period in an oil field, but has no effect on periodic production rates over time prior to shutdown of the field. In contrast, the economic model of oil production from a heterogeneous reserve predicts that a severance tax not only lowers cumulative extraction, but decreases current production rates. The effect on production rates is precluded in the MER model. 3 In this paper, we propose a nested empirical test of the geo-engineering principle of maximum efficient recovery against a specific economic alternative. The main idea is quite simple and may be summarized as follows. In the geo-engineering MER model, given an initial investment in the depth, size, spacing, and number of oil wells in an oil field, pumping costs remain constant over time once production commences, while the quantity of oil produced per period declines at a hyperbolic rate. This decline in periodic production is due to a decrease in pressure in the oil field as the cumulative amount of oil extracted increases. As a result, the time paths of current and cumulative oil production trace out a single iso-cost curve in the current᎐cumulative oil production plane. The shape of this iso-cost line is Ž . determined by the field-specific parameters of the MER model. By noting that current production is the time derivative of cumulative production and working backwards from the MER rule, we obtain a functional relationship between current and cumulative oil production that is logically equivalent to the MER rule for that field. Under reasonable conditions 4 , this functional relationship determines the structure of the pumping cost function up to an arbitrary monotonic transformation. This structure for the periodic pumping cost function is then taken to be an integral part of the producer's economic problem of maximizing the net present value of profits from oil production. The result is that the geo-engineering MER rule is nested within the economic wealth-maximization model. The hypothesis test has the simple form of two parameter restrictions for each field.
We apply this approach at the individual oil field level using quarterly data from seven Montana oil fields. This allows us to overcome the aggregation problems w x noted by Halvorsen and Smith 16 , as well as the issues associated with measuring w x the prices of natural resource products as in Barnett and Morse 4 , Heal and w x w x w x Barrow 18 , Smith 36, 37 , and Slade 35 , rather than the opportunity cost of in situ stocks of the resource. Another distinction of this study from previous work is the isolation of oil production from existing wells within an oil field from the production response that is due to the drilling of additional wells.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews models of petroleum supply, with a focus on studies that model production from known reserves. Geo-engineering principles underlying production decline models for oil and gas extraction are w x However, also see Farzin 12 for a supply model based on optimizing principles. 3 In the economic model, a severance tax may lengthen or shorten the production life. 4 Sufficient conditions for this result are that the cost function is finite and twice differentiable in current and cumulative oil production.
presented and explained. The economic theory of exhaustible resource use is adapted to formally incorporate these geo-engineering principles into the pumping cost function for a wealth-maximizing oil firm. This cost function then is included in an economic model of production from mature oil fields. The result of these steps is an economic model of oil production that contains the geo-engineering MER model as a nested restriction. In Section 3, the economic model is estimated and hypothesis tests are conducted based on a sample of seven oil fields in Montana with sixty quarterly time series observations over the period from September, 1971 through June, 1986. 5 The final section contains a summary and conclusions.
MODELS OF PETROLEUM SUPPLY
The process of discovering and developing petroleum resources consists of two major components: the discovery of new reserves and production from existing reserves. New reserve additions result from the drilling of successful new wells that either discover new petroleum accumulations or extend the boundaries of known fields. Production from existing fields occurs, for the most part, from development wells drilled within known field boundaries. Oil and gas supply models treat the drilling of new wells as a process distinct from that of producing oil from established fields, segregating the petroleum exploration phase from that of reserves production. Since the first formal supply models were created in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the vast majority have focused on the process of exploring for new reserves. This is in spite of the fact that annual oil and gas production from established reserves is far greater than are reserve additions. w x Deacon et al. 8 provide a useful survey of models in which changes in petroleum supply stem primarily from reserve additions. Relatively few models of petroleum supply explicitly include production from established fields. Of the petroleum supply models that include production from known reserves, most adopt a framework in which it is assumed that, without the drilling of new wells, production from developed fields will decline continuously over time in a manner that is determined by geological factors. In these models, production declines by a constant percentage over time, thereby following a pattern of exponential decline. w x In the model by MacAvoy and Pindyck 29 , the short-run supply function is defined by the marginal cost of developing existing reserves through the drilling and operating of new wells. An exponential decline pattern of production from reserves is assumed in developing the marginal production cost function. An increase in output price yields an increase in the production rate from established fields through the drilling of additional production wells. Because this is the only production response from existing fields, and because production from new wells is allocated to the reserve additions process, this model predicts no short-run supply response for established fields. 5 is the argument that a change in the price of oil alters the period of production from an oil field. In each of these models, so long as production follows an exponential decline pattern, pumping costs remain constant over time. Hence, the production rate for each well eventually declines to the point where a producer's revenue, net of taxes and royalty payments, equals the constant periodic operating cost of the well. This point is termed the economic limit. Given an increase in the wellhead price of oil, revenues increase proportionately in each production period. But there is no output response, so that pumping costs remain constant. Therefore, the economic limit is reached at a later date and the total amount of oil produced from the well increases. In the absence of drilling additional production wells, this is the only avenue for an economic response in exponential decline models of oil production from mature fields.
Geo-Engineering Models of Oil Production
As oil is extracted from existing wells, the energy causing oil to flow to the wellhead is depleted so that well productivity decreases with time and with the w x cumulative amount of oil produced 20, 22, 30 . The causes of the negative relationship between the current production rate and cumulative past production are explicit in the formulation of one of the fundamental equations of subsurface fluid flow, termed Darcy's Law. 6 Although Darcy's Law is most often associated with ground water flow, it is easily adapted to the nonturbulent flow of any fluid w x through a porous medium. Following Nind 32 , Darcy's equation may be written
where FrA is the rate of flow per unit cross-sectional area across a rock face of area A, is the permeability of a homogeneous rock medium, is the viscosity of the fluid, and Ѩ prѨ l is the rate of pressure drop in the overall direction of flow. As Ž . can be seen from Eq. 1 , the flow rate through a petroleum reservoir will decline with either a decrease in the pressure gradient across the reservoir or an increase in the viscosity of the fluid. Both of these occur in petroleum reservoirs, to varying degrees, as a function of cumulative production.
Darcy's Law, coupled with the decline in reservoir pressure and increase in the viscosity of the remaining crude oil as a field is produced, predicts that the maximum flow rate of crude oil to a producing well will decrease with cumulative production. The simplest type of production decline results from a reservoir with no water drive, where reservoir pressure is proportional to the amount of remainw x ing reserves, and where crude oil viscosity remains constant 32 . In such an idealized reservoir, the relationship between cumulative oil produced and pressure is linear, as is the relationship between the production rate and cumulative production.
For a reservoir with the characteristics described above, the linear relationship Ž . Ž . t Ž . between the production rate, q t , and cumulative production, Q t ' H q s ds, This type of production decline with time is termed exponential decline. It has the property that the ratio of the production rate to remaining reserves is constant throughout the production horizon. With a constant percentage change in production, the decline rate is constant for the life of the well. The decline rate is a property that varies among producing wells and which can be estimated using simple linear regression analysis. Taking the natural log of both sides of the exponential decline equation gives log q t s log q y 1ra и t. 6
With data on initial and subsequent production rates, the decline rate can be estimated using this relationship. Most actual petroleum pools, however, do not have the idealized characteristics described above. Although exponential decline is often assumed for limited time periods due to its mathematical convenience, it has been found that, if assumed for w x longer periods, it leads to an underestimation of ultimate recovery 32 . One reason for this is that reservoir pressures generally decline at a slower rate as cumulative w x production increases 2 . This, coupled with an increase in the viscosity of the remaining oil, causes the relationship between the current production rate and cumulative production to be nonlinear. This nonlinear relationship is known as hyperbolic decline. The generalized hyperbolic decline and its special case of exponential decline are the most commonly used geo-engineering models of production decline.
With hyperbolic decline, the relationship between the rate of change in current production and time is modified to
Ž . The production rate at any time, t, is now obtained by integrating Eq. 7 , Ž .
The special cases with b s 0 and b s 1 are known as exponential and harmonic Ž . decline, respectively. Since Q t F R for all t G 0, while
we must have a ) 0 and 0 F b -1 for the hyperbolic decline model to be consistent with a positive, finite initial stock of oil. Finally, we will find it useful Ž . Ž . later to combine Eqs. 8 and 9 and solve for current periodic production as a function of cumulative production to write the MER rule in the equivalent form
Petroleum engineers use equations of the form of Eqs. 8 and 9 to estimate ultimate oil recovery, future production rates, and the total length of production.
Ž . The top expression in Eq. 8 is used for approximating production decline over short time intervals, while the bottom expression is used for longer periods. In the models of petroleum supply briefly reviewed above, production decline from existing wells is assumed to follow the exponential decline rule due to its convenience. However, we depart from this practice and adopt the more general hyperbolic decline when we develop a pumping cost function for oil production Ž . from mature fields. Specifically, for b s 0 we have q s yqra from Eq. 7 , whilė where a dot over a variable indicates the rate of change with respect to time, that Ž . Ž . is, q t s dq t rdt. This is the form of the hyperbolic decline model that wė employ in our empirical work discussed in Section 3.
Economic Models of Oil Production
Hotelling's rule, that price minus marginal cost rises at the rate of interest in the w x exploitation of a non-renewable resource 21 , relies on several conditions. These include the existence of a purely competitive market, that the amount of oil in the reservoir is known with certainty, and that the costs of extraction do not depend on the amount of oil remaining in the reservoir. Further interpretations of Hotelling's rule, the implications of relaxing various assumptions in the basic model, and the empirical validity of the theoretical result are the subject of a large and well-known literature. 7 The assumption of uniform resource quality as employed in the basic theory of the mine is not appropriate for crude oil reservoirs. Because of the decline in natural reservoir pressure over time as oil is extracted, the amount of artificial lift required to maintain a given daily production rate will increase, leading to an increase in pumping costs. While the general case of rising extraction costs has been examined in several studies, 8 relatively few studies adapt the theory of exhaustible resource extraction to the specifics of petroleum production. 9 With declining resource quality, the oil producer's economic problem includes Ž . the effects of increasing marginal costs of production over time. Let R t denote the current quantity of remaining oil reserves in the field, and denote the cost Ž Ž . Ž .. function for oil extraction by C q t , R t . We assume that the cost function is twice differentiable, increasing in the current extraction rate,
Ž . decreasing in the current stock of remaining reserves, R t ,
Ž . and convex in q t . The oil producer's economic problem is to maximize 
Ž . where r is the real discount rate, p t is the market price of oil, and T is the final production period.
The Hamiltonian for this optimal control problem is
where the time argument has been suppressed for notational convenience. In this Ž . Ž . Ž . problem, R t is the state variable, q t is the control variable, and t is the Ž . co-state variable or shadow price for the equation of motion for R t . For all t G 0 Ž . such that q t ) 0, the first-order conditions for an optimal extraction path are
Ž .
In addition, the transversality condition determines the optimal extraction period,
T in free terminal time problems. 10 In this study, however, we are primarily con-Ž . Ž . cerned with the first-order conditions in Eqs. 20 ᎐ 22 .
Nesting the Geo-Engineering and Economic Models
Applications of the geo-engineering MER rule to oil production assume that total per-period extraction costs are constant over time if the production rate follows a hyperbolic decline path.
11 The MER rule implies that the primary economic decision that the operator makes is whether to operate the field at full capacity in a given period or shut it in. If all wells in the field operate, the operator incurs a given pumping cost and obtains an output determined by the reservoir decline function. The decline function gives a relationship between the field's output and the field's reserve. This induces a specific relationship between cost, output, and reserves. This relationship can be represented as a restriction on the Ž . 12 conventional extraction cost function, C q, R .
The notion that pumping costs are constant with hyperbolic production decline has been applied to oil fields of various sizes and depths, with different drive mechanisms, and initial production rates. Tacitly, the MER rule asserts that if production is positive, then pumping costs are constant and extraction follows a hyperbolic decline rule. If the pumping cost function also is finite, twice differentiable in current and cumulative oil production, and convex in the current output level, 13 then by tracing out the iso-cost line associated with the MER extraction path we recover a structure for pumping costs that nests the MER model within an economic model of oil production from established fields.
Toward this end, it is at times useful to rewrite total extraction costs in terms of cumulative extraction. Recall that cumulative oil production to time t is t Q t s q s ds, 2 4 Ž . Ž . Ž .
H 0 while the remaining stock at time t is defined as the initial stock minus the Ž . Ž . cumulative quantity of oil that has been extracted by then, R t ' R y Q t . 0 Hence, the periodic extraction cost function can be rewritten as
To provide a heuristic illustration of the main ideas behind our approach, Ž . Ž suppose that pumping costs have the simple additive structure C q, Q s c. Ž. aQ , where c и is an arbitrary increasing and convex function of a single variable.Ž . Ž . Constant pumping costs over time implies that 0 s Ѩ CrѨ q иѨ CrѨ Q и q s Ž . Ž . cЈaQ иaq , making use of the fact that current production is the timė rate of change of cumulative production. Hence, pumping costs remain constant if Ž . and only if either cЈaQ s 0,aq s 0, or both. For all smooth and strictlẏ 12 We are extremely grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this explanation of the MER rule. 13 Although twice differentiability of extraction costs is a standard assumption in the economics literature on exhaustible resource exploitation, a reviewer pointed out that these conditions and the corresponding interpretation of the MER rule are far from innocuous. For, if pumping costs are smooth, then an extraction path that satisfies the MER rule implies that the oil field operator cannot be Ž a rational economic agent. An alternative interpretation of the MER rule suggested by the same . reviewer is that pumping costs are independent of q and R, i.e., the marginal cost of oil extraction is zero up to the rate determined by the MER rule, and infinite at all levels above that rate. This interpretation implies that a rational oil field operator would optimally pursue the MER rule as a Ž bang-bang solution to the oil extraction problem. In fields with multiple wells, however, pumping costs cannot be completely independent of output, since some pumps may be turned on but the rest turned . off in any given period, reducing both output and costs .
As will be seen in the development that follows, two important parameters in our empirical model are the reciprocal of the slope of the marginal cost curve and the ratio of marginal cost to the slope of marginal cost, both evaluated along the MER path. If marginal cost is zero, but the slope is infinite at each point along the MER path, both parameters equal zero. Moreover, the parameter restrictions associated with the MER rule are the same for both interpretations. In either case, a rejection of the MER rule implies that the bang-bang solution defined by the MER extraction path is suboptimal and that the oil field operator responds to economic incentives. On the other hand, a failure to reject the MER rule could result either because agents are not economically rational, pumping costs are not Ž . smooth, or both or perhaps some other reasons which we have not considered .
Ž .
Conversely, suppose we observe an exponential decline extraction path whicḣ˙˜Ž . Ž . satisfies qrq s ya and C s 0. Since C s 0 requires qrq s y Ѩ CrѨ Q r Ѩ CrѨ qḟ or cost functions that are strictly increasing in q, we must have a constant slope to the iso-cost line along the observed oil production path. Continuous differentiabil-Ž ity of the cost function implies that locally i.e., in a neighborhood of every point on . that particular iso-cost line , the structure of the cost function can be recovered up 0 Ž . to a monotonic transformation. That is, C q, Q s C , a constant, if and only if
s y , 2 6
Ž Twice differentiability of the cost function in fact, continuous differentiability is . sufficient implies that this additive structure for the cost function must continue to Ž . hold throughout a possibly small neighborhood of each point on the observed extraction path. 14, 15 Now, returning to the general case of hyperbolic decline, we proceed by totally differentiating extraction costs with respect to time,
. where the right-hand side is obtained by substituting q s yqr a q bt and R ṡ yq. Thus, under the MER rule, the iso-cost curve has a slope equal to y1r Ž . a q bt , 14 If costs are not smooth, but rather are discontinuous at the MER production rate, then the MER path defines the boundary between zero and infinite marginal extraction costs. This limiting case of the construction here forms the basis for the alternative interpretation of the MER rule discussed in footnote 12.
15 Ž . One might think that since Ѩ qrѨ Q is independent of q as well as Q in this example , so that the cost function is additively separable in current and cumulative production, pumping costs must be linear Ž 0 . 0 Ž in current output, i.e., g C s ␣ q ␤ C for some constants ␣ and ␤. This point was argued forcefully . by a reviewer. However, this is an incorrect conclusion. For any smooth, strictly monotonic transforma-Ž . Ž . tion ofaQ, say caQ , including all those for which cЉaQ ) 0, we obtain the constant Ž . Ž . Ž . cost condition 0 s cЈaQ иaq . Hence, cЈaQ ) 0 implies c s 0 if and only ifaq s 0˙Ž
. for all such cost functions c и .
This result is analogous to the ordinality of utility functions, which results from the fact that we only are able to identify the marginal rates of substitution between consumption goods in consumer demand analysis. In the present case, the information transmitted by a MER extraction path only includes the structure of a single iso-cost curve. This is an insufficient amount of information to identify the shape of the marginal cost curve in addition to the shape of the iso-cost curve. Nevertheless, it is a sufficient amount of information to form the basis for an empirical test of the MER hypothesis.
Ž 0 . where q R, C is defined by the implicit function theorem,
Next, by methods analogous to those commonly used to recover expenditure functions in the theory of consumer behavior and cost functions in the theory of the firm, given the MER time path relating R to t, we recover the structure of the cost function up to an arbitrary monotonic transformation. First, substitute R y Ž . Ž .
16
R s Q for Q in 9 and solve for 1r a q bt , which gives 0
Ž . Second, combine this with Eq. 28 to generate the partial differential equation
Third, integration with respect to R implies Ž . Note that C и is additively separable in q and Q s R y R, hence a function of 0 one variable only. 16 The two limiting cases We proceed next by exploiting the first-order conditions for an optimal economic Ž . path. First, differentiate Eq. 20 with respect to time, 2 2
Ž .
Second, equate this to Eq. 21 and eliminate and e , 2 2
Ž . Third, substitute yq for R from Eq. 22 , and replace Ѩ CrѨ R with
which is obtained by differentiating Eq. 33 with respect to R. Replace Ѩ CrѨ R Ѩ q with Ž . In fact, if the MER rule is correct, then combining 8 and 9 above, we have x ' 0 ᭙ t G 0.
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The Montana Department of Revenue has maintained quarterly records on total crude oil output, total revenue, and state severance tax payments for each field in w x the state since 1971 31 . The sample period for this study is from September, 1971 through June, 1986. Seventy-one fields reported production throughout the sample period. Of these, eighteen fields were eliminated from the sample because they had at least two quarters of missing data. Of the remaining fields, only those which did not experience an increase in the number of producing wells during the sample period were included in the sample. The reason for this restriction is to isolate the production response of existing wells within a field from the production response resulting from the drilling of new wells and increasing the reserve base of the field. While it would be desirable to jointly model the number of producing wells per field and the production per well, the data is not available which would allow a distinction to be made between new wells designed to increase production from existing reserves and new wells designed to increase field reserves. Of the fifty-three fields with complete information over the entire sample period, eleven experienced no increase in producing wells. Four of these fields were under secondary recovery operations during the sample period. The remaining seven fields are included in the estimation. Brief descriptions of these fields are found in Table I .
In the empirical model, the independent variables involving output price are the real net wellhead price of oil and quarterly changes in that price. In determining net price, the wellhead price is adjusted to account for the presence of royalty fees and certain taxes in the following way. The producer's quarterly revenue net of royalty fees and taxes can be written pq s p q y RP y S y W , 4 1
Ž .
w where q is the quarterly output of oil, p is the wellhead price, RP is the royalty w payment, W is the windfall profit tax, and S is the state severance tax. We abstract from federal and state corporate income taxes and property taxes because the tax rates for these taxes remained essentially constant throughout the sample period. 18 Wellhead prices may vary greatly across fields due to differences in the characteristics of the crude oil such as gravity and sulfur content. Quarterly total revenue and quantity data are available from the state of Montana on a field-by-field basis. This allows the wellhead price for each field to be calculated separately, which controls for quality variability across fields. This also partially controls for the effects of price controls that were in effect during 1973 through 1981. However, during this period of time, production classified as ''old oil'' was subject to price controls, while production classified as ''new oil'' was uncontrolled. Because the uncontrolled price was higher than the controlled price, the use of quarterly Ž field-wide prices yields an average price weighted by the production of old and . new oil rather than a marginal price. For the most part, however, the production from the sample fields was classified as old oil under the price controls. There was a small amount of production from two of the sample fields that was classified as new oil. However, the volume of new oil from these fields was small and limited to 18 The top marginal federal corporate income tax rate declined from 48% to 46% in 1979. However, this minor change is ignored. only a few quarters during the sample period. 19 Therefore, the effect of using an average wellhead price, rather than the appropriate marginal price, should be small.
Royalty payments are assumed to be a constant fraction of gross revenue from a field per quarter. Thus, for a royalty rate of ␦ , assumed to be 12.5% during the sample period, royalty payments are Montana
s w Ž . The federal Windfall Profits Tax WPT was an excise tax on the ''windfall profit'' from taxable crude oil produced after February 29, 1980 and before August 23, 1988 . 21 WPT tax rates varied according to tier and type of producer. The oil produced from the sample fields falls under the Tier 1 category, which was subject to the highest WPT rates of 70% for producers identified as one of the major integrated oil companies and 50% for independent oil producers. For this study, the relevant rate was determined on a field-by-field basis, with fields operated by independent firms having the lower tax rate applied to all production from the field and fields operated by major producers having the higher rate applied.
The windfall profit on which producers were taxed was the excess of the wellhead price over the sum of the adjusted base price and a severance tax adjustment. The original base for Tier 1 oil was the wellhead price per property in March, 1979 minus 21 cents. The base price was adjusted upward by the percentage by which the quarterly implicit GNP price deflator exceeded the deflator for the quarter ending June 30, 1979 . The severance tax adjustment is the amount by which any severance tax imposed exceeds the severance tax which would have been imposed if the oil had been valued at its adjusted base price. The producer is assumed liable for windfall profits taxes only on the producer's economic interest in the field because the royalty owner pays the tax on royalty production. Total windfall profits tax payments are where t is the windfall profits tax rate and p is the adjusted base price. where PPI is the quarterly producer price index. For empirical estimation with discrete data, we replace the time derivatives with discrete differences, ⌬ q s q y q and ⌬ p s p y p . The discrete analogue
Ž . to Eq. 12 for the MER rule is modeled as tion data are normalized by the initial output level in each field to improve the numerical properties of the empirical model, which is nonlinear in the parameters. Table II presents the results for the MER model. In both Tables II and III, R  2 is the squared correlation between the observed and predicted values of y , DW is t the Durbin᎐Watson statistic for remaining serial correlation in the error terms, and the estimated asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses below the parameter estimates. The tabulated results are system estimates with a separate correction for first-order autocorrelation in each equation. The estimation method is Ž . iterative nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression equations SURE , which is equivalent to full information maximum likelihood. 22 We also considered MER models of the form
and of the form
Ž w x. Based on the likelihood dominance criterion Pollak and Wales 34 , other econometric properties of the model estimates, and the consistency of the parameter values with the a priori restrictions of the Ž . MER model, we selected 47 as our preferred specification. However, complete details on the alternative models are contained in an expanded version of the paper that is available upon request. The economic alternative to the hyperbolic decline rule can be written as
for i s 1, . . . , 7 and t s 2, . . . , 60 as in the MER specification. This specification for the economic alternative assumes that the net real wellhead price of oil in the current period is known to the field operator at the time that operating decisions are made. 23 The properties of the error terms are assumed to be the same as for the MER model.
Numerical difficulties were encountered when we attempted to estimate r, and the log-likelihood function displayed little dependence on the value of r. Hence, Ž the real rate of time discount was held fixed at 2.5% per quarter which is . equivalent to a real annual discount rate of 10.4% in all fields and the remaining parameters were estimated conditional on r for the results presented in Table III. 24 23 We also considered alternative forms of expectations processes, including myopic, adaptive, and rational price expectations. Detailed results for these alternative models are contained in the expanded version of the paper noted in footnote 22. None of the conclusions reached in this paper are altered by these alternative forms of price expectations. The empirical results are quite similar across the alternative forms of the econometric model, but the perfect foresight model dominates all other alternative specifications based on the likelihood dominance criterion. 24 The unrestricted estimate of r was y9.11 = 10 y3 with an asymptotic standard error of .0771 and value of the log-likelihood function equal to 553.072. Negative values of r less than y.01 per quarter generated an undefined log-likelihood function. A search of the log-likelihood function over r from 0% Ž . to 10% per quarter equivalently, 0% to 46% per year resulted in log-likelihood values that monotonically declined from 553.068 at r s 0 to 552.166 at r s 0.10. The log-likelihood at r s 0.025 per quarter was 552.771. None of the results of the paper are changed over this full range of values of the real discount rate.
Treating the MER rule as the null and the economic response model as the alternative, the two hypotheses can be stated as
Thus, it is straightforward to test H against H with a likelihood ratio test. The 0 1
value of the likelihood ratio statistic for the results presented in Tables II and III In addition, for both the MER and economic models, we tested for the a priori an asymptotically 6 statistic of 30.90, which has a probability value of 2.65 = 10 y5 . We therefore reject the hypothesis that they lie in the unit interval. 25 In addition, four of the estimated c are negative, although none are individually i statistically different from zero at standard levels of significance. A joint test that 2 Ž . all four are equal to 0.0001 produces an asymptotically 4 statistic equal to 0.99 with a probability value of .912 and we do not reject the hypothesis that c ) 0, ᭙ i. 2 Ž . which is asymptotically distributed as a 10 and has a probability value of .0135. Hence, we reject this hypothesis at the 5% level of significance, but can not reject it at the 1% level. Finally, a likelihood ratio test of the restricted MER model against the restricted economic alternative gives a test statistic of 37.74, which is 2 Ž . approximately distributed as a 9 random variable, with a probability value of 1.94 = 10 y5 . Hence, as in the case of the unrestricted versions for both models, we strongly reject the hypothesis that oil production from established fields is solely driven by the MER rule, and therefore invariant to changes in the market price of oil. 25 It is worth noting that this result is more damaging to the MER model than the economic Ž . Ž x alternative. The reason is that the variable x defined in 40 is strictly concave in R for all b g 0, 1 , but is convex in R for b F 0. Hence, the second-order conditions for an optimal path are violated with â strictly positive b. Moreover, none of the positive b 's are significantly greater than zero in the economic i model.
CONCLUSIONS
The process of exploring for and developing a petroleum deposit encompasses a series of operations that may span several decades. To make tractable economic models of a process as complex as domestic petroleum supply, simplifying assumptions and techniques must be employed. This is especially true for the process of production from reserves. The geological and engineering constraints imposed on production, coupled with the significant empirical difficulties associated with estimating production cost functions, have fostered the use of supply functions not derived from the producer's underlying optimization problem.
One contribution of this paper is to develop a production cost function that incorporates the dynamics of oil and associated gas movement within the reservoir. The hyperbolic production decline function, applicable to a variety of drive mechanisms, is used in the specification of the effects of the current extraction rate and cumulative production on current costs. This provides a viable alternative to w x the calibration approach recently used by Deacon 7 .
The principal use of petroleum supply models is to estimate the response of current and future output to changes in real prices. By assuming that the production rate is invariant to economic factors, most previous models constrain reserves production so that the only avenues of response to price variations are the drilling of new development wells and changing the length of the production horizon for existing wells. This can bias the estimated price elasticity of oil supply. We tested whether or not the current rate of output responds to price changes in petroleum supply. Our empirical results indicate that the economic model based on geoengineering considerations significantly outperforms the MER model. We therefore reject the notion that there is no economic response in the rate of production from established oil fields.
We conclude that, in addition to the possibility of new development drilling, producers are likely to change both the current production rate and the length of the production horizon for existing wells in response to a change in output price. The response of the production rate to changes in output price will be small for fields with few wells near the end of their producing life. However, the response may be large for large fields with many wells with high production rates. 26 In addition, we conclude that the relationship between output price and the economic life of an oil field is not unambiguously positive as has been claimed in several previous studies.
